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RESEARCH NOTE

Picking Federal Judges:

A Note on Policy and
Partisan Selection Agendas
MICHEAL W GILES, EMORY UNIVERSITY
VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, INDIANA UNIVERSITY
TODD PEPPERS, EMORY UNIVERSITY

The importance of lower federal courts in the policymaking process has
stimulated extensive research programs focused on the process of selecting the judges of these courts and the factors influencing their decisions.

The present study employs judicial decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals as a window through which to reexamine the politics of selection
to the lower courts. It differs from previous studies of selection in three
ways. First, it takes advantage of recent innovations in measurement to go
beyond reliance on political party as a measure of the preferences of actors

in the selection process. Second, employing these new measures it examines the relative effects of the operation of policy and partisan agendas in

the selection process. Third, a more complex model of selection is
assessed than in most previous studies-one that expressly examines the
role of senators and senatorial preferences in the selection process. The
results clearly suggest that the politics of selection differ dramatically
depending upon whether or not senatorial courtesy is in operation. The
voting behavior of Courts of Appeals judges selected without senatorial
courtesy is consistent with the operation of a presidential policy agenda.

Among judges selected when senatorial courtesy is in play, the linkage
between presidential preferences and judicial outcomes disappears.

The lower federal courts play a significant role in the creation of

policy Awareness of the importance of lower courts in the policymakin
has motivated a research program focused on the process of selecting th

of these courts (Goldman 1997; Sheldon and Maule 1997; McFeele

Chase 1972; Grossman 1965). This largely qualitative scholarship has d
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rich picture of the roles played by the various actors in the process, the motiva-

tions at work, and the impact of the political context. The importance of the
lower courts has also justified an active research program examining the factors

influencing the decisions of the judges of these courts (e.g., Songer, Segal, and

Cameron 1994; Songer and Haire 1992: Davis 1986; Rowland and Carp 1996;
Carp and Rowland 1983). The latter has advanced our understanding of judicial
decision making by explicating the roles played by case facts, background experiences, policy preferences, and higher court supervision.
While these research programs individually have been quite fruitful, the
linkage between the two has not been well articulated. We have a richly textured
understanding of the process by which lower court judges are selected but little
evidence linking the elements of that process to judicial outcomes. Studies of
decisionmaking in the lower federal courts have employed the party affiliation of

the appointing President, combined in some studies with one or more background variables, as a surrogate measure for the policy preferences of the judges.

A large body of literature examining the decisionmaking of both District Court
and Court of Appeals judges has found that judges appointed by Democrats tend

to be more liberal in their decisions than judges appointed by Republicans
(Goldman 1966; 1975; Carp and Rowland 1983; Rowland and Carp 1996; Row-

land and Todd 1991; Stidham and Carp 1987; Songer and Davis 1988; 1990;
Songer and Haire 1992; Pinello 1998). While these results indicate that the party
which controls the selection process makes a difference, little else can be concluded about the linkage between the politics of selection and judicial outcomes.
The model of selection implicit in most studies of lower court behavior is simply

too reductive to provide leverage on this larger question.

A few studies of judicial outcomes have assayed more complex and realistic models of the politics of selection by including a role for home-state senators

(Rowland, Carp, and Stidham 1984; Songer 1982; Rowland and Carp 1996).
These studies suggest, at a minimum, that the involvement of home-state senators in the selection process may condition the linkage between presidential
preferences and judicial outcomes. For example, Rowland, Carp, and Stidham
(1984) argue that liberal senators in Massachusetts (including the liberal Republican Brook) thwarted Nixon's efforts to appoint "law and order" judges in that
state. Similarly, Songer (1982) finds that the relationship between the party of

the appointing President and judicial outcomes is stronger among judges
appointed where senatorial courtesy was not in play (i.e., no senator of the Pres-

ident's party from the state) than among judges appointed under the condition
of senatorial courtesy Judicial outcome studies also provide at least some support for a direct linkage between the preferences of home state senators and
judicial outcomes. Songer (1982) finds a relationship between the liberalism of
Court of Appeals judges and the liberalism of the home-state senator of the President's party.
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While highly suggestive, these studies have two limitations. First, their scope

is relatively limited. Songer (1982) focuses on outcomes in the Courts of Appeals

between 1962 and 1971. Rowland, Carp, and Stidham (1984) examine decisions
in District Court criminal cases in only four states. Rowland and Carp (1996) focus

on the decisions of District Court judges appointed by Reagan and Carter in thirteen states. Second, and more importantly, these studies are limited by the absence
of rigorous measures of preferences. Rowland, Carp, and Stidham (1984) and Rowland and Carp (1996) essentially make qualitative judgments about whether the
preferences of senators are consistent with those of the President. Songer (1982)
develops a rigorous measure of senatorial preferences based on roll-call voting, but
has no similar measure of the preferences of the President. Without rigorous meas-

ures of the preferences of both Presidents and senators, the linkage between the
politics of selection and judicial outcomes cannot be fully explored.
Efforts to explicate the linkage between the politics of selection and judicial
outcomes must also confront the very different conclusions the two research pro-

grams have developed about the role of policy preferences in the selection
process. In the most comprehensive study of selection to date, Sheldon Goldman

(1997) concludes that in the postwar era, appointments to the lower courts have

reflected a partisan and not a policy agenda. That is, Presidents have used
appointments to the lower federal courts as a means of rewarding party faithful
and shoring up party cleavages and not as a means to support their policy agenda

(3). In Goldman's estimation only the Reagan administration viewed ". . . the
courts as likely to affect the success or failure of its policy goals" and followed a

policy agenda in selection (4, 361). For the Reagan administration, Goldman
argues, it was not sufficient to be a loyal Republican. Successful candidates for
appointment also had to provide evidence of conservative policy views congruent with those of the administration.

There is little in the selection literature to dispute Goldman's conclusion that

partisan not policy concerns dominated the judicial selection process in the post-

war era.1 Chase (1972: 72-73) recounts how both Kennedy and Eisenhower saw
judicial appointments as a means of shoring up intra-party cleavages-Kennedy
by making appointments to supporters of Adlai Stevenson and Eisenhower to
supporters of Taft. The selection literature describes Presidents Eisenhower (Chase

1972: 102; Navasky 1971: 265; Goldman 1997: 127-28), Kennedy (Navasky
1971: ch. 5; Chase 1972: 80-81; Goldman 1997: 167-68)2 and Johnson (McFeeley 1987: 43, 54, 86-88; Goldman 1997: 170) as concerned about the position of
their appointees to southern courts on civil rights. But, this concern was limited

The selection literature also suggests that senators use judicial appointments to pursue a partisan rather

than a policy agenda (Grossman 1965: 82; Richardson and Vines 1970; Tolchin and Tolchin 1971).
2 Navasky (1971: 252-57) and Chase (1972: 88) portray the Kennedy administration in very different lights in terms of the importance they attached to judicial appointments.
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to that single issue area and subject to override by the need to compromise with
powerful, southern senators (Lyles 1996).3
In contrast to the selection literature, studies of judicial decisionmaking have
attributed policy motivations in the selection of lower court judges not only to
President Reagan, but also to Presidents Johnson (Rowland, Carp, and Stidham
1984; Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994), Carter (Songer, Segal, and Cameron

1994: note 3; Songer and Haire 1992; Songer and Davis 1988, 1990; Baum
1998: 293), and Nixon (Rowland, Carp, and Stidham 1984; Songer, Segal, and
Cameron 1994).4
Whether this conflict in the conclusions of the two research programs is real

or only illusory is unclear. Selection research typically documents the expressed
motivation of the Presidents and their staffs. One of the primary lessons of behav-

ioralism is that actors are not always aware of their own motivations. Presidents
and their staffs may consider the ideology of potential nominees without being
aware of that criterion and without making its operation explicit in memoranda,

procedures, or subsequent interviews with scholars. As Goldman (1997: 3) freely
admits, the documentation of motivations is elusive.
On the other hand, the use of political party as a surrogate for policy preferences in most decisionmaking studies confounds policy and partisan motivations. Democratic and Republican party identifiers differ ideologically. On average Democratic identifiers are more liberal than Republican identifiers. This
difference is particularly marked among the active party elites from which lower
federal judges are typically selected (McClosky, Hoffman, and O'Hara 1960; Baer
and Bositis 1988). Thus, a purely partisan selection strategy on average will produce systematic differences in the policy preferences of judges and in their deci-

sions. Hence, the empirical finding in many decisionmaking studies that judges
appointed by Democratic Presidents are more liberal than those appointed by
Republican Presidents is consistent with the operation of either a policy or a partisan agenda in the selection process.
The present study employs judicial decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals as a window through which to reexamine the politics of selection to the
lower courts. It differs from previous decision-based studies of selection in three
ways. First, it takes advantage of recent innovations in measurement to go beyond
reliance on political party as a measure of the preferences of actors in the selection
process. Second, employing these new measures it examines the relative effects of

3 McFeeley (1987: 58) recounts the following memo between White House advisor Cliff Carter and
President Johnson. "Strom Thurmond is holding out . . for a former law partner of his. .... It is
said Thurmond wants this badly and probably could be used as trade bait on Civil rights, endorsement by the South Carolina Democratic Convention, and insurance against unpledged electors."
4 Songer et al. (1994) follow Tate and Handberg (1991) in assigning ideological motivations to Johnson and Nixon.
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the operation of policy and partisan agendas in the selection process, effects con-

founded in previous research. Third, a more complex model of selection is
assessed than in most previous studies-one that expressly examines the role of
senators and senatorial preferences in the selection process. The analysis does not
address the expressed motivations of the actors involved in judicial selection. It
focuses instead on determining if the behavior of the judges once appointed is
consistent with the operation in the selection process of a partisan agenda or a
policy agenda, and the influence of senatorial courtesy on either of these agendas.

The answer to these questions lies not in focusing on whether judges' decisions
reflect policy preferences but rather on whose preferences they reflect.

MODELING JUDICIAL SELECTION
A Policy Agenda Model of Selection

The President and his surrogates clearly control the selection of justices to the

United States Supreme Court. A President's choice may be influenced by a Senate
controlled by the opposite party or by his status as a "lame duck," but no other

actors have the power to control the President's choice (Guliuzza, Reagan, and
Barrett 1994; Ruckman 1994; Segal 1987). The policy model assumes that Presidents seek to select judges with policy preferences as close as possible to their
own. In the absence of constraints, the policy model predicts judicial outcomes to
be strongly related to the President's own policy preferences. The presence of other

actors in the selection process at the Court of Appeals level suggests the operation

of presidential policy preferences may be attenuated in some circumstances. This
is a possibility we return to in our discussion of senatorial courtesy below.
A Partisan Agenda Model of Selection

As noted above, the finding that federal judges appointed by Democratic
Presidents are more liberal than those appointed by Republican Presidents is
consistent with the operation of either a partisan or a policy agenda in the selection process. Given differences in the ideological center of gravity for the two par-

ties, the implementation of a partisan agenda will produce ideological differences
in the voting patterns of judges. How then can we distinguish the operation of
preference maximizing by the President (i.e., the operation of a policy agenda)
from the simple outcome of partisan selection?
If a partisan agenda is at work, then the policy preferences of the judges
selected should reflect the preferences of the population from which the judges
are chiefly drawn-state party elites. Under the partisan agenda the President is
not selecting to maximize the fit of the judge to his own policy preferences.
Rather, he is selecting to reward party loyalty and support in previous campaigns,
to bridge or reflect intrastate cleavages within the party, and sometimes simply to
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reward long-term personal friendships.5 Thus, under the partisan model the
President selects a judge from the pool of state party elites with each selection
based on idiosyncratic factors unrelated to the specific policy preferences of the
President. On average, judges selected in this fashion should reflect the ideolog-

ical preferences of the pool from which they are selected and not necessarily

those of the selector.6

In summary, the partisan and policy agenda models produce very different
expectations. If a partisan agenda is operative, then the behavior of the judges
selected will reflect the policy preferences of the party elite in the state from
which their appointments are made. On the other hand, the policy agenda model
assumes that Presidents select judges from among state party elites whose policy
preferences most clearly conform to their own. Hence, if the policy agenda model
is operative, then knowing the policy preferences of the selector should tell us
more about the behavior of the judges than simply knowing the preferences of
the state party elites from which they are drawn.
Senatorial Courtesy

Though the President and his surrogates have substantial control over the
selection process for Supreme Court nominees, selection studies paint a far different picture for the lower courts. Most notably, individual senators of the President's party are active participants in the selection of lower court judges. The
power of senators is most apparent in filling District Court vacancies. The geographic jurisdiction of these courts is confined within state boundaries and the
judges are routinely selected from persons residing in the state if not the district.

Since the Courts of Appeals cover several states the claim of an individual senator to control over an appointment is arguably less than for District Courts (Gold-

man 1967: 186-214; Chase 1972: 43-44; Sheldon and Maule 1997: 184).7 However, seats on the Courts of Appeals in fact are often associated with a particular
state, giving senators of the President's party a claim to influence if not control of

the appointment. Even when the allocation of a circuit seat to a state is unclear

Goldman (1997) refers to selection based on friendship as reflecting a "personal agenda" but personal friendship is typically combined with support in previous political campaigns and membership in the same political party.

6 The operation of the partisan agenda is analogous to the President randomly sampling out of the
pool of party elite within a state. The preferences of the party elite within a state are not homoge-

neous and judges selected by this process even in a single state may differ in their preferences.
However, with repeated sampling the expected value of the preferences for the judges selected will
be the mean preference for the pool of potential candidates, the state party elite.

7 Chase (1972: 99) recounts instances of the Eisenhower and the Kennedy (84) administrations winning in negotiations with senators but also instances in which senators held out for their Court of
Appeals nominee against the best efforts of the administration (85).
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upon vacancy, senatorial claims apply once the seat is assigned (McFeeley 1987:
55; Grossman 1965: 120; Sheldon and Maule 1997: 21). Thus, even for appointments to the Courts of Appeals Presidents cannot afford to alienate senators who
can affect the success of presidential legislative initiatives (Grossman 1965: 37).8

The expectations for whether the President will operate under a policy
agenda or a partisan agenda are less clear when the conditions for senatorial
courtesy are present. At least some descriptions of the selection process suggest
that where senatorial courtesy is operative, the senator essentially picks the
judge. To the extent that this description is accurate, we would expect judges to
reflect the policy preferences of the relevant senator rather than those of the Pres-

ident or of the state political elite.
DATA AND MEASUREMENT

Controlling the Legal Context

Assessing the partisan and the policy models rests on the assumption that
the decisions of judges of the Courts of Appeals are affected by their policy pref-

erences. The models simply differ on how those preferences emerge from the
selection process. While a preference model has proven powerful in explaining
Supreme Court behavior (Segal and Spaeth 1993), this has been less the case in
the lower courts. Even assuming that judges are motivated by their preferences
existing precedent and clear case facts control case outcomes in many lower
court cases (Rowland and Todd 1991: 176). For example, criminal cases are routinely appealed to the Courts of Appeals and just as routinely rejected by both
conservative and liberal panels. Even if one doubts the efficacy of precedent as
an internal constraint, there is substantial evidence that lower court judges are
responsive to oversight by higher courts (Songer 1987; Songer and Davis 1990;
Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; Stidham and Carp 1982). A judge selected to
reflect Eisenhower's policy preferences might vote more liberally than predicted
from those preferences as a result of serving during a period of oversight by the
liberally dominated Warren Court. Conversely, a judge appointed to maximize
Johnson's policy preferences may vote more conservatively than expected as a
result of the supervision of the Burger and Rehnquist courts. Thus in assessing
models of the politics of selection it is important to focus on cases where ideological differences are most likely to be operative and to control for the legal context in which the judges are operating.

8 Johnson was even willing to give a powerful senator of the opposing party a voice in selecting
judges. "We want to get Dirksen's help on the tax bill" (Goldman 1997: 173). Other Presidents were
forced to reckon with senators of the opposing party who successfully opposed nominations (e.g.,

315).
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The present study focuses on judicial behavior in civil rights and civil liberties cases decided with dissent between 1953 and 1988 by judges appointed by
Presidents Eisenhower through Reagan.9 The data are drawn from the Courts of
Appeals data set.10 The unit of analysis is the vote of individual judges. Liberal

votes are coded as 1 and conservative votes as 0. Only the votes of judges
appointed by a President of their own party are included in the analysis.11
Civil rights and civil liberties have been key issues distinguishing liberals

and conservatives in the postwar period. Indeed, Carmines and Stimson (1989)
have argued that racial issues like civil rights have been key to the shifting align-

ments of the Democratic and Republican parties during this era. If policy prefer-

ences are at work in judicial decisionmaking, we would expect to observe their
operation in cases involving these issues. Of course not all civil liberties and civil
rights cases escape the constraints of clear facts and existing case law By focusing only on cases decided with dissent we hope to minimize the effects of these
constraints.12 In a case decided with dissent the law and/or facts are not sufficiently clear to produce agreement. It is in such cases that the operation of pref-

erences is most likely to be detected.

To control for Supreme Court oversight, we include in the analysis a measure of Supreme Court liberalism in civil rights and civil liberties cases. These data

are drawn from Epstein et al. (1996: Table 3-8). The data are lagged one year. It
is the need to control for the changing legal context that requires the analysis to

focus on the behavior of judges in individual cases. A score for average liberalism across the cases decided in a judge's career would fail to consider the possible effects of shifts in the legal context in which the decisions were made.
Measuring Preferences

The measurement of preferences is a key element in operationalizing both
the policy and the partisan selection models. In the past, the measurement of
congressional preferences has relied principally on interest group scores such as
those compiled by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). Interest group

9 The selection of Eisenhower as the starting point of the analysis was determined by the availability of presidential policy preference measures. This is discussed later.

10 Donald R. Songer, The United States Courts of Appeals Database. National Science Foundation
Grant SES-8912678.

11 Cross-party appointments are relatively infrequent and are departures from the general processe

under consideration here. In the present study only ten judges were eliminated from considera-

tion by this restriction. See Chase (1972: 74-75) for a discussion of cross-party nominations under

Kennedy and Goldman (1997: 69) for an example cross-party nomination under Truman.
12 Songer (1982) has provided sound evidence that preferences are operative in unanimous as well

as non-unanimous cases at the Courts of Appeal but there is also evidence that such differences
are more evident in cases decided with dissent (Gottschall 1986).
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scores have also been used as a basis for computing preference measures for Pres-

idents (Zupan 1992). Poole and Rosenthal (1997) have recently developed new
measures of ideological preferences for Congress. Their results indicate that con-

gressional voting can be conceptualized largely in terms of a single ideological
dimension with a second dimension rising to importance in a few historical eras.
The scores of senators and congressmen on this first dimension are strongly cor-

related with traditional interest group measures (e.g., ADA) but overcome their
principle shortcomings.13 The Poole and Rosenthal common-space scores are
comparable across the chambers of Congress and over time. The preferences of
senators from one era can be compared directly with those from a later time
period. Likewise, scores for senators and members of the House share a common

metric. Poole (1998) has extended the method to provide common-space estimates of the preferences of the Presidents since Eisenhower.

The present study uses the first dimension common space scores to measure
the ideological preferences of the appointing President and relevant senators.

Scores on this dimension are scaled from -1 for most liberal to +1 for most con-

servative. Absent senatorial courtesy the measure of senatorial preferences is
assigned a value of zero. If senatorial courtesy is operative and there are two senators of the President's party in a state, senatorial preferences are measured as the

mean of the common space scores of the senators.14

Berry et al. (1998) have developed annual measures of citizen and government ideology in the American states.I5 Their measures are based on the interest
group scores of each state's congressional delegation. We follow the lead of Berry

et al. (1998) in using the congressional delegation as a basis for estimating the
preferences of state party elites. However, for the reasons noted above we employ

the common space measure of Poole and Rosenthal (1997) rather than the interest group scores used by Berry et al. (1998). We calculated for each judge the
mean common space score for the state congressional delegation of the President's party in the year of the judge's appointment. If there is no congressman of
the President's party in the state from which an appointment was made, the judge

and the cases s/he decided are excluded from the analysis.16

13 See Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) for a discussion of the weaknesses of interest group
scores as measures of preferences.
14 In some states with two senators of the President's party, the senators rotate the appointments. To
the extent that this occurs frequently and the preferences of the two senators are widely disparate,
use of the mean will introduce error.

15 Berry et al. (1998) create summary scores that do not break down ideology by party within each
state and, hence, are not appropriate for our purpose.

16 Berry et al. (1998) employ a very complex mechanism to estimate congressional delegation
policy positions in states lacking a delegation from a particular party. We feel that the more
appropriate approach for our purposes is simply to limit the analysis to cases where the requisite
data is available.
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Measuring Political Context

The effects of both the policy and partisan agendas on judicial behavior may
be conditioned by the political context. When confronted with a Senate controlled

by the opposing party the President and/or the senator may act strategically to
insure confirmation and select a candidate whose policy position is closer to that
of the opposition than they would if not so constrained (Lyles 1996).17 For example, Nixon's ability to select "law and order" judges arguably was constrained by a

Democratic Senate and the shift to a more liberal chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee (Rowland, Songer, and Carp 1988: 193). Likewise, Clinton's appointments to the lower courts may have been more moderate than expected given his
reerences as a result of Republican control of the Senate during his second term

(Baum 1998: 293). Unfortunately, the present data do not provide a means of
assessing this possibility. For the data in this study, all of the Republican Presidents

and none of the Democratic Presidents faced a Senate controlled by the opposite
party. A simple measure of whether the Senate is controlled by the same party as
the President is thus empirically confounded with the party of the President.

A second element of the political context that may condition appointment
strategies is the election cycle. As the election year approaches there is substantial evidence that Presidents encounter increased difficulty in obtaining confirmation for their nominees for the Supreme Court, even when their party controls

the Senate (Gulliuzza, Reagan, and Barrett 1994; Ruckman 1993; Segal 1987).
The Senate minority has many opportunities to delay hearings and confirmation
votes, hoping for a victory by their own party in the upcoming election. Again,

a President may act strategically under this condition and nominate a candidate
closer in policy preferences to the minority than he would if not so constrained.

Thus, a lame duck Democratic President is expected to appoint somewhat more
conservative judges and a lame duckRepublican President is expected to appoint
somewhat more liberal judges than they appoint during the first three years of
their term. To capture these possible effects two measures were created. The first
takes the value of 1 for a judge appointed by a Democratic President in his fourth
year and 0 otherwise. The second takes the value of 1 for a judge appointed by
a Republican President in his fourth year and 0 otherwise.
ANALYSIS

Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, judicial vote, logistic regression analysis is employed. Since multiple cases appear in the data set for

17 Contrary to the logic of the partisan model, these political conditions may force the selectors to

consider the preferences of the potential candidates. The focus, however, is not on maximizing
preference congruence but on identifying a co-partisan acceptable to the opposition.

632

This content downloaded from
132.174.251.59 on Sat, 17 Jul 2021 16:08:23 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Picking Federal Judges

each judge, robust standard errors are employed in all significance tests to compensate for the hierarchical structure of the data (Giles and Zorn 2000). The results
of the initial analyses, which test the alternative presidential agendas, are presented

in Table 1. In terms of the legal and political context variables, the results do not
comport well with expectations. In each of the models, the liberalness of the U.S.
Supreme Court in civil liberties cases has no effect on the probability of a liberal
decision in the cases under study The lame duck variables are signed in the direc-

tion opposite to that expected but are also statistically insignificant. Thus, lame
duck status does not appear to constrain the exercise of preferences.

The results for the partisan agenda model appear in Column A of Table 1
and are consistent with expectations. Remembering that preferences are scaled
from -1 for most liberal to +1 for most conservative, the negative coefficient for
state party elite preferences is appropriately signed and statistically significant.

TABLE 1.
EVALUATING PARTISAN AND POLICY MODELS OF SELECTION
A

B

C

Partisan
Model Model Policy Model
A

in

A

in

A

in

B Probability B Probability B Probability
Presidential Preferences -1.5718** -.298 -1.2103** -.233

(.3279) (.4877)
State Elite Preferences -4.4030*** -.427 -1.8484 -.188

(.8587)

(1.2479)

Supreme Court Civil .0045 .009 .0022 .005 .0022 .005
Liberties % (.0071) (.0067) (.0069)

Republican Lame Duck -.3915 -.092 -.2764 -.068 -.1657 -.038
(.3986) (.3652) (.3881)

Democratic Lame Duck .2152 .046 .6646 .143 .1625 .036

(.4824) (.5360) (.4374)
Constant
PRE
N

-.3898

.220

832

One

.261

890

-.3930
.248

832

asterisk

Robust

The

-.4123

change

value

indicat

Standard

of

in

the

presidential,

Err

proba

indepen

partisa

entire
study
period
dent
this
is
from
-.4
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-.26
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.24.
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variables
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States with liberal political elites are more likely to have federal judges appointed
who reach liberal decisions in civil liberties cases than are states with more con-

servative elites. Thus, as expected if a partisan agenda is at work in selection, fed-

eral judges broadly reflect the ideological preferences of the pool of candidates
from which they are drawn, state party elites.

The results for the policy agenda model that appear in Column B of Table 1
are also consistent with expectations. The measure of the preferences of the Pres-

ident is appropriately signed and statistically significant. The more liberal (conservative) the President, the more liberal (conservative) are the judges appointed.

Given the average difference in the preferences of Democratic and Republican
Presidents, judges appointed by Democratic Presidents are 29.8 percent more
likely to vote liberal in a civil liberties case than are judges appointed by Republican Presidents. The policy model also provides a small improvement in prediction over the partisan agenda model (.26 versus .22).
Do the policy preferences of the President matter once we take into account the
preferences of the state party elites from which nominees are selected? Stated differ-

ently, do Presidents select candidates from the available pool of state party elites
without regard to the policy preferences of the candidates, or do they select judges
who tend to reflect their own policy preferences? This question is initially addressed

in Column C of Table 1. The policy preferences of the President are again appropriately signed and statistically significant. A judge appointed by a Democratic President is 23.3 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote in a civil liberties case than a
judge appointed by a Republican President. The relationship between state party
elite preferences and judicial voting does not reach traditional levels of statistical sig-

nificance, though it approaches that level (.07). The coefficient is appropriately
signed and the effect of coefficient suggests that a judge selected from the average

pool of Democratic state elites is 18.8 percent more likely to vote liberal in a civil
liberties case than a judge selected from the average pool of Republican state elites.
The analysis in Table 1 suggests that presidential policy preferences are more closely
linked to judicial outcomes than are the preferences of the state political elite.

Both qualitative and quantitative treatments of the selection of federal lower
court judges suggest that the politics of the selection process differ fundamentally

depending upon whether or not senatorial courtesy is operative. The analysis in
Table 2 provides a rigorous assessment of that suggestion. The model estimated
uses dummy variables to provide conditional estimates of the effects of preferences on the behavior of the judges. The coefficients are directly interpretable as
the effects of presidential, senatorial and party preferences when senatorial courtesy is and is not present. 18 This approach is equivalent to but more easily interpretable than the more common multiplicative approach to interaction.

18 The effect of senatorial preference, of course, is already conditioned by the presence of senatorial

courtesy. For a discussion of this approach to modeling interaction see Wright (1976).
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The results of this analysis presented in Column A of Table 2 clearly confirm

that the politics of selection are conditioned by the operation of senatorial courtesy.19 In the absence of senatorial courtesy, presidential preferences are significantly related to the decisionmaking of the selected judges. As the selecting Pres-

ident's preferences become more liberal (conservative), the probability of the
selected judges deciding civil liberties cases liberally (conservatively) increases.
Given the average difference in the preferences of Democratic and Republican
Presidents, judges appointed by Democratic Presidents when senatorial courtesy
is not operative are predicted to be 41.8 percent more likely to vote liberal than
are judges appointed by Republican Presidents under similar conditions. The
failure of state party elite preferences to achieve statistical significance among
judges appointed when senatorial courtesy is absent provides clear support for
the operation of a policy agenda in presidential selection of judges. The decisional behavior of judges selected absent the constraint of senatorial courtesy
more closely conforms to the preferences of the appointing President than to the
preferences of the party elite of the state from which they were selected.
The results when senatorial courtesy is operative differ substantially from
those when it is not operative. The behavior of the judges selected under the condition of senatorial courtesy is unrelated to the preferences of the Presidents who

formally nominated them. The voting behavior of these judges is also apparently
unrelated to the preferences of senators, or of the party elite of the states from

which they were selected. However, caution should be exercised in interpreting
this result. The measure of state party elite preferences and the measure of senatorial preferences are strongly related. By and large senatorial preferences reflect
the policy preferences of the other party elites within their state.
The results in Columns B and C of Table 2 clarify this relationship. Under
the condition of senatorial courtesy if state party elite preferences, the measure

of the partisan agenda, are excluded from the equation, then senatorial preferences have an appropriately signed and statistically significant effect on the
behavior of the judges. Conversely, if senatorial preferences are excluded under
the condition of senatorial courtesy, then the indicator for the partisan agenda
becomes statistically significant. Under the condition of senatorial courtesy,

Prob libvote = a + biD1 (pres) + b2D2 (pres) + b3D, (partisan)+ b4D2 (partisan) + b5(senate)

+ b6(SupCt)+ b7(Dlame)+ b,(Rlame)+ b9 (Courtesy)
Where: D1 = 1 if conditions for senatorial courtesy are met; 0 otherwise
D = 1 if conditions for senatorial courtesy are not met; 0 otherwise
Courtesy = 1 if senatorial courtesy is present; 0 otherwise.
19 While the courtesy variable is included in the model for completeness, the substantive interpretation of its effect is relatively trivial. The results indicate that on average more liberal judges were

selected under courtesy This reflects the fact that for the period under study more judges were

appointed under the condition of Democratic than Republican senatorial courtesy
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TABLE 2.

ASSESSING THE POLICY AND PARTISAN MODELS UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF
SENATORIAL COURTESY
A

A

B

in

A

C

in

A

in

B Probability B Probability B Probability
NO SENATORIAL
COURTESY

Presidential Preferences -2.6333*** -.418 -2.3041*** -.400 -2.6306*** -.403

(.7557) (.5955) (.7651)
State Elite Preferences .1383 .007 .1479 .006

(1.9418)

(1.9357)

SENATORIAL COURTESY

Presidential Preferences .0001 .000 -.3762 -.050 -.0017 .000

(.5045) (.4516) (.4986)
Senatorial Preferences -.6552 -.043 -1.6374*** -.156

(.7869) (.5182)
State Elite Preferences -3.1731 -.236 -4.4054*** -.346

(1.9912)

(1.3385)

Supreme Court Civil .0062 .007 .0059 .009 .0061 .006
Liberties % (.0070) (.0068) (.0070)

Republican Lame Duck -.1627 -.020 -.2427 -.040 -.1557 -.018
(.3876) (.3731) (.3816)

Democratic Lame Duck .0199 .002 .4161 .056 .0726 .008

(.4377) (.5571) (.4234)

Courtesy .4996* -.069 .2939 -.049 .5393* -.070
(.2556) (.2426) (.2497)

Constant -.9460** -.8040* -.9443**
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presidential preferences are unrelated to the liberal/conservative decisionmaking
of the judges. This holds regardless of whether senatorial preferences or the pref-

erences of the state party elite are included in the model. Thus, when judicial
appointments occur with senatorial courtesy in effect these data suggest that the

President is unable successfully to pursue a policy agenda. However, since the
policy preferences of senators and the party elite of their states are strongly cor-

related, it impossible to determine whether senators employ their own policy
agenda or a partisan agenda when senatorial courtesy gives them an active role
in the selection of judges of the Courts of Appeals.20
Goldman (1997) attributes a policy agenda to Ronald Reagan. Some quantitative studies have also suggested that the concern for policy in the selection of
lower federal judges is a recent phenomena but have suggested that Carter as well
as Reagan appointments were driven by a policy agenda (Davis 1986; Rowland,

Songer, and Carp 1988; Songer and Davis 1990; but see Note 1987). Are the
results in Table 2 driven by the operation of policy preferences only under Presi-

dents Carter and Reagan? This possibility was assessed by repeating the analysis
in Table 2 first with judges selected by President Reagan excluded and second,
with judges selected by Presidents Reagan and Carter excluded from the analysis.
The outcomes of these analyses (not shown) are essentially no different from those
in Table 2. Thus, these data suggest that the pursuit of a policy agenda by Presidents is not an isolated or recent phenomenon. While Reagan may have been
more open in discussing the role of policy preferences in selection, a policy agenda
appears to have been pursued by Presidents throughout the period under study.
SUMMARY

In his seminal work on the selection of federal judges Sheldon Goldman
(1997) has argued that with the exception of Reagan, Presidents in the postWorld War II period have generally followed a partisan agenda. That is, Presidents have used such appointments to reward and strengthen their political par-

ties and have not attempted to maximize the policy congruence between
themselves and the judges. The present study has provided a rigorous test of the

operation of the policy and partisan agendas in the selection of judges to the
Courts of Appeals. While Goldman's work focuses on documented motivations,
the present study seeks to identify traces of the operation of these agenda in the
behavior of the selected judges.

20 A common suggestion to address multicollinearity is to collect different data that do not suffer from

collinearity. We did this in two ways. First, we used an alternative measure for the state political

elite (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1989). We also attempted to increase our sample size by using
the Amelia program to impute data for states for which there is no congressional delegation of the

same party as the president (King, Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve 2000). Neither approach yielded
substantially different results, and we retained our original measure of state elite preferences.
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The results provide interesting insight into the politics of selecting judges of

the lower federal courts. These data clearly suggest that the politics of selection
differ dramatically depending upon whether senatorial courtesy is in operation.

The voting behavior of Courts of Appeals judges selected without senatorial
courtesy is consistent with the operation of a presidential policy agenda, not a
partisan agenda. With presidential preferences taken into account, state party
elite preferences are unrelated to subsequent judicial behavior. Thus, Presidents
do not simply select co-partisans to be judges of the Courts of Appeals. From the
pool of co-partisans within a state, they select nominees who reflect their own
policy preferences.
Among judges selected when senatorial courtesy is in play, the linkage
between presidential preferences and judicial outcomes disappears. This finding
does not deny the validity of the documented instances where Presidents or their
emissaries have wrested control of an appointment from a senator or forced a
compromise. What it does suggest is that these are more likely aberrations than

the rule. Even if Presidents do not hand over the appointment process to senators enjoying courtesy, these findings suggest that, at a minimum, Presidents
under the condition of senatorial courtesy become more responsive to the political milieu of the state than is the case with appointments when senatorial courtesy is not a factor. Since senatorial courtesy is present in nearly 65 percent of the
cases analyzed this is a substantial constraint on the appointment process.
The results of this analysis provide no support for the idea that a shift has
occurred in the agenda operative in the selection of federal judges. Goldman and
others suggest that a policy agenda has been operative only since President
Reagan or perhaps President Carter. While not disputing Goldman's findings that
Reagan more than his predecessors was open about his policy motivations in
selecting judges, the present analysis suggests that policy preferences have been
operative throughout the postwar period when the President is not constrained
by senatorial courtesy Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, etc. talked less about
policy in the selection process and did not build the institutional framework to
assure the policy congruence of appointees as did the Reagan administration but
in the end they selected federal judges who reflected their policy preferences
whenever possible.
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